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1. Introduction 
This article is concerned with an analysis and discussion of how both Scottish 
and English law approach and rationalise rights in property and other resulting 
and associated rights in relation to fugacious and migratory properties which 
move to and fro across tracts of land by virtue of their inherent characteristics. 
This definition encompasses such things as running water, wild animals and 
fugacious minerals. For want of a more eloquent means of expression, in this 
article such objects have been termed 'migratory things'.(2) 
The article begins by seeking to establish two main principles: first, the extent 
to which rights of property can be said to exist in migratory things present 
upon or beneath land and secondly, the extent to which a law of capture 
operates in relation to such things. A law of capture would sanction the 
appropriation of migratory things from another's land by the carrying out of 
works or some other activity upon one's own land. The term 'law of capture' 
was first coined during the oil boom in late 19th century USA, where the 
expression was used to describe the legal sanctioning of the appropriation 
from a common reservoir of oil underlying the land of another by legitimate 
drilling activities. The courts at that time were quick to draw analogies with, 
and draw upon the law relating to, other things that were perceived to share 
the 'vagrant' characteristics of oil such as running waters and wild animals. 
As this article will illustrate, however, the law relating to migratory things is 
opaque and uncertain, and both under Scots and under English law there may 
be real difficulties in rationalising judicial approaches to migratory things with 
established principles of land law. This article seeks to unravel at least some of 
the uncertainties that exist, compare and contrast the approaches of the two 
systems, and discuss some of the problems invoked by the current state of the 
law. 
 
2. Ownership 
 
2.1 What is ownership? 
In assisting the analysis it may first be prudent to cast an eye over what the 
concept of ownership in general entails. In common parlance, ownership is a 
term that most of us take for granted in that if we buy, are given or inherit 
items, ownership generally follows. Ownership implies the general liberty to 
use, dispose, destroy or transfer the thing in question to others. If ownership 
rights are to be meaningful in any practical way then it is important that they 
are safeguarded in some sense against the actions and claims of others. The 
right of ownership is safeguarded by (amongst others means) law. Ownership 
can thus be referred to as 'the legal right that a legal system grants to an 
individual in order to allow him or her to exercise the maximum degree of 
formalized control over a scarce resource'.(3) This idea can be derived from the 
civil law concept of dominium, the greatest right in property to 'use and 
dispose of a thing in the most absolute way alluded to in early Roman texts'.(4) 
This concept of dominium is the 'ultimate right, that which has no right behind 
it'.(5) Common law sources also refer to such an definition. According to 
Blackstone, ownership could be considered as 'the sole and despotic dominium 
of an individual over a thing'.(6) As we shall see, however, English law 
arguably does not countenance the idea of ownership, at least in its full 
civilian sense. 
It should be noted, however, that the right of ownership is seldom an absolute 
right. As Mattei notes '[c]ommon law countries have been traditionally 
cautious to emphasize the extent of the owner's powers, always employing the 
idea of reasonableness to limit him or her in the interest of his or her 
neighbors. It is of no surprise therefore that the most important contribution of 
Anglo-American legal scholarship to property law is the metaphor of the 
bundle of rights. This clever metaphor defines ownership (and property) as a 
bundle of rights (and duties) enjoyed by an individual over a thing.'(7) 
As Smith therefore states, '[t]here is rarely an unlimited right to use property, 
witness the tort of nuisance and planning permission requirements for land 
development'.(8) In general therefore it can be said that an owner's rights are 
often limited under both common law and statute to take account of the rights 
of others. We shall return to this idea later. 
2.2 The importance of ownership 
According to Mattei, '[o]wnership must be protected by the most effective set 
of legal remedies that are available in the legal system given the 
circumstances. Typically, the owner will be protected against (1) 
dispossession (by a remedy that allows him to recover the commodity), (2) 
behaviors that interfere with the exercise of the property right both temporarily 
(nuisances) or permanently (destruction) (in this case the legal system will use 
the most effective protection that is available given the circumstances - 
typically injunctions and other specific remedies - rather than damages), and 
(3) claims both explicit or implicit of incompatible rights over the object of 
ownership.'(9) 
The way in which such remedies arise across the Scottish and English systems 
are not the same, however. Scots law follows Roman law in stipulating that 
ownership is an absolute right.(10) As Carey Miller states '[p]roof of a right of 
ownership prevails over other claims not derived from the owner's right'.(11) 
Whereas under Scots law, therefore, remedies tend to arise as a result of the 
fact of ownership, this is by contrast often not the case south of the border. As 
Smith states, '[o]wnership in English law is remarkable for the absence of 
remedies based upon proof of ownership . . . [common law] remedies are 
usually based upon possession and rights to possession. It is generally 
sufficient simply to prove a better right than the other party and not 
necessarily to prove absolute ownership. This has the consequence that issues 
relating to ownership are less likely to come before the courts.'(12) 
This legal proposition is very much symptomatic of the historical inductive 
development of the common law system, whereby it was the existence of 
recognised legal remedies themselves that bestowed rights, rather than the 
deductive civilian notion that the existence of a general right would confer 
certain remedies. As no special remedies under English common law have 
developed to enforce proprietary rights, actions tend to be brought on grounds 
such as trespass, tort or nuisance, which are based upon interference with 
possession.(13) 
As this article will illustrate, in many instances, the English cases which deal 
with migratory things are therefore not generally concerned with whether or 
not ownership vests in the thing appropriated but rather whether any remedy 
arises where the right of one party is damaged by the actions of another - for 
example, in nuisance, under a right of support or contrary to certain riparian 
rights. In Scotland, although such grounds of complaint may be sought where 
appropriate, remedies do arise from the fact of ownership itself and hence the 
more important issue is likely to be dominium and rights which arise 
therefrom. 
 
3. General principles of landownership 
 
3.1 The 'infinite carrot'? 
 
3.1.1 England 
The absolute nature of the rights to the land bestowed by a grant in fee simple 
have been set out by Coke as 
Land, in the legal signification comprehendeth any ground, soil or earth whatsoever, as 
meadows, pastures, woods, moores, waters, marshes, turfs and heath . . . It legally includeth 
all castles, houses and other buildings . . . [and] besides the earth doth furnish man with many 
other necessaries for his life, as it is replenished with hidden treasures, namely with gold, 
silver, brasse, iron, tynne, leade and other mettels and also with great varietie of precious 
stones and many other things for profit, ornament and pleasure. And lastly the earth hath in 
law a great extent upwards, not only of water, as hath been said, but of ayre and all other 
things up to heaven, for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum . . .(14) 
This last maxim, literally that 'to whomsoever the soil belongs he also owns it 
to the sky', was later augmented by 'ad centrum terrae' - to the centre of the 
earth - or 'et ad inferos' - to the depths. As we shall see, below, however, this 
concept has been limited in a practical sense under English law. 
3.1.2 Scotland 
The doctrine is also recognised under Scots land law. In Scotland 'a 
conveyance of land in unqualified terms [dominium utile] gives a right to 
property in the substance or solid contents of the land without any assignable 
limit. This is what is meant by a conveyance being a coelo usque ad centrum. 
There are no limits in the vertical direction except such as physical conditions 
impose.'(15) 
3.2 Practical effects of the doctrine 
What the doctrine in its pure sense means is that the owner in fee simple or 
holder of the dominium utile has an absolute right to not only the solum but 
everything above this including air space and all that lies below the ground. 
The property rights bestowed on the owner are of course not absolute in the 
sense that they are restricted under both common law and statute in a number 
of ways and also subject to subordinate real rights which others may hold over 
the land. Aside from these exceptions, strict adherence to the doctrine would 
by definition mean that migratory things on land such as running water and 
fugacious minerals are the property of the landowner. As we shall see, 
however, this may not be the case. 
3.2.1 The doctrine in England 
The general thrust of the doctrine itself has been attacked, particularly south of 
the border, where it has been described as a 'fanciful phrase'.(16) Indeed 
operation of the doctrine appears to have been watered down significantly in 
England and Wales. This is probably in a large part due to the fact already 
alluded to that under English common law the issue of ownership is rarely a 
factor in determining whether a remedy will arise in any particular case. What 
is important is whether any legal rights of the landowner have been infringed - 
and such a right will exist only if there is a known remedy supporting it (and 
not the other way around). The common law does not exhibit any special 
remedies based upon ownership, therefore it would seem that other remedies 
(for example, in tort or in trespass) must be put forward by the aggrieved 
party.(17) 
Most of the relevant cases where the doctrine is discussed relate to trespass or 
intrusion into airspace in some way by an adjacent landowner. These cases 
bear out the limited practical nature of the cujus est solum brocard in England 
and Wales. It seems according to these authorities that some sort of damage or 
injury must be proven before an action for trespass into airspace will be 
upheld and general doubt has been cast over the extent to which ownership 
can be held in a vertical limit up to the heavens.(18) 
Although the case law is by no means consistent, it is arguable that the current 
situation under English law can perhaps best be summed up by Griffiths J in 
Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd: 
The problem is to balance the rights of an owner to enjoy the use of his land against the rights 
of the general public to take advantage of all that science now offers in the use of air space. 
The balance is in my judgement best struck in our present society by restricting the rights of 
an owner in the air space above his land to such height as is necessary for the ordinary use and 
enjoyment of his land and the structures upon it, and declaring that above that height he has no 
greater rights in the air space than any other member of the public.(19) 
3.2.2 The doctrine in Scotland 
In contrast to the tenuous status of the doctrine south of the border, it would 
appear that it remains strong in Scotland. In Scotland, the doctrine cujus est 
solum arguably extends to airspace above the land without limit.(20) Unlike the 
position south of the border, as Reid contends, '[t]he question is one of 
dominium, not of the balancing of “rights”; and the authorities are unanimous 
in asserting that dominium lies in the landowner and in him alone.'(21) It is 
arguable, however, that the sparse case-law reveals more ambiguity than Reid 
would suggest. 
In Scots law, the general rule seems clear that any overhanging structural 
projection into another's airspace would require to be removed if the adjacent 
proprietor objected.(22) The position in Scotland relating to overhanging trees 
is blighted by a lack of case-law. From neither Halkerston v Wedderburn(23) 
nor Brokie v Scougal(24) can any definitive principles be deduced; it being 
unclear to what extent the damage to property needs to be proven. 
In the one modern case in this area, the court made express reference to the 
cujus est solum argument when it granted interdict against crane operators 
when the jib of one of their cranes passed over a landowner's tract of land.(25) 
It should be noted, however, that in this case, the pursuer did allege danger to 
himself and his family and is it unclear from the case-report the extent to 
which this element of danger was pertinent to the court reaching the decision 
that an interdict be granted.(26) 
3.3 Subterranean rights 
Apart from certain reservations to the Crown and created conventional 
reservations or separate tenements, as a consequence of the cujus est solum 
doctrine, owners of the solum are entitled to all which lies beneath their 
properties to the centre of the earth. In Scotland therefore '[s]o in a downward 
direction landownership encompasses the ground itself and all that is part of 
the ground (pars soli). This includes the constituent materials of the ground - 
soil, stones, minerals and the like - and also trees, plants, buildings and other 
objects above the ground which have acceded to it.'(27) 
The same applies in England and subject to similar exceptions set out above, 
all beneath the property including minerals belongs to the owner of the solum. 
Indeed the English position is enshrined in statute in the sense that 'land' as 
defined in s 205(1)(ix) of the Law of Property Act 1925 includes 'land (of any 
tenure) and mines and minerals . . . buildings or parts thereof and other 
corporeal hereditaments'. 
 
4. Property rights in migratory things 
A few basic observations can be made prior to examining property rights 
which exist across the various migratory things. Certain of these objects are 
treated as res nullius, i.e. things in their natural state incapable of individual 
ownership but generally owned by the first person to acquire or contain them 
in some way. In others, a qualified property right - generally a right to reduce 
into possession - may be vested in the landowner. In others, still, it is arguable 
that ownership of the thing in situ is possible (notwithstanding that it has not 
yet been reduced into possession). 
As a general point, the limitations placed upon the landowner's rights of 
property in such items which are situated on his land can be viewed as 
limitations on strict operation of the doctrine cujus est solum. 
4.1 Property rights in running water in Scotland and England 
 
4.1.1 General points under English law 
Notwithstanding that there are certain rights in water which arise by virtue of 
ownership of riparian property, it has been asserted that flowing water, 
whether flowing in a known and defined channel or percolating through the 
soil in a random fashion is not the subject of ownership at common law.(28) 
The rationale underlying this is that water, in common with the air that we 
breathe, is a natural life-sustaining element common to all mankind. 
In a similar manner to capturing a wild animal, water which has been 
appropriated or taken into possession either from a defined channel or from 
that percolating beneath the land is the subject of property, albeit only 
throughout the time of possession.(29) Similarly, water which is held in some 
sort of receptacle will be the property of the party who has possession of 
water, in so far as that possession endures.(30) 
4.1.2 Riparian rights in England 
Rights which, although falling short of full ownership, are proprietary in 
nature may vest in flowing water, however. In relation to streams which flow 
in a known and defined pathway, certain riparian rights exist. For example, at 
common law, a riparian although not able to draw away all the water, has 
certain rights: he has the sole right to fish in the water;(31) he has a right to the 
continual flow of water through the land, subject to the ordinary and 
reasonable use of the water by the upper riparian owners;(32) he has the right to 
take and use water for all reasonable domestic purposes(33) or perhaps in some 
cases manufacturing purposes even where this may result in the stream being 
exhausted;(34) and he has the right to draw water for extraordinary purposes 
provided that such use is reasonable(35) and the water is not substantially 
altered in volume or character.(36) 
Known and defined channels may also exist underground and the same rules 
which apply to those channels above ground also apply to those below. The 
onus of proving that the channel is known and defined, however, will fall upon 
the person claiming the riparian rights. In the Irish case of Black v Ballymena 
Township Commissioners,(37) Chatterton VC remarked: 
The onus of proof is on the person claiming riparian rights and it lies on him to show that 
without opening the ground by excavation or having recourse to abstruse speculations of 
scientific persons, men of ordinary powers and attainments would know, or could with 
reasonable diligence ascertain, that the stream when it emerges into light comes from and has 
flowed through a defined subterranean channel.(38) 
Such riparian rights have no role to play in the case of underground water 
which percolates in an unknown, random way. Landowners have no right to 
replenishment of this source and thus an adjacent landowner can extract such 
water with no regard to the rights of others whose land dries up as a result of 
water failing to arrive there.(39) Furthermore, the motives behind one 
landowner's abstraction of the percolating water appear to be of no relevance. 
In Bradford v Pickles, where there was evidence of unscrupulous motives on 
the part of the party draining the water prior to it reaching an adjacent 
landowner's well - it was alleged this was done to force the sale of the land - 
the court found that this was irrelevant in finding no grounds of action for the 
defendant.(40) 
4.1.3 Property rights and subterranean water in England 
These above cases are often commonly cited in support of the general 
proposition that no property lies in underground water. There is confusion, 
however, in the interpretation of some of the cases often cited as authority for 
this proposition. This confusion may be of little surprise, however, given that 
the facts of these cases are often obscure and judgements not particularly 
sound.(41) 
In fact, in Acton v Blundell, which concerned the right of a landowner to divert 
underground water away from the land of another,(42) the Lord Chief Justice 
expressed the view that 'the owner of the soil [has] all that lies beneath the 
surface; the land below is his property, whether it be solid rock, or porous 
ground, or venous earth, or part soil, part water' (emphasis added). This obiter 
comment of the Lord Chief Justice in fact suggests that the landowner does 
have property in water percolating below his land as such water is pars soli. 
Campbell has cast doubt on this viewpoint, however, remarking that, 
the context in which the dictum was expressed however was . . . the question whether the right 
to the enjoyment of an underground spring . . . was governed by the same rules of law as those 
which apply to and regulate a water course flowing on the surface. . . . [The Lord Chief 
Justice] was therefore addressing primarily the issue of the right to use the underground water 
and not the question of its ownership.(43) 
It is submitted that such a view stretches what the Lord Chief Justice stated - 
his words, 'the owner of the soil has all that lies below the surface; the land 
[including the water] below is his property' seem fairly unequivocal to this 
writer. Nonetheless, Campbell's viewpoint that underground percolating water 
is res nullius is supported by the approach taken in Ballard v Tomlinson,(44) 
where in determining whether a right to claim for the pollution of underground 
percolating water may arise, the court held that a claim could arise even 
though such water was res nullius. 
Notwithstanding this view, support for the proposition that there is a right of 
property in underground percolating water can be found elsewhere. In 
Bradford v Pickles, A.L. Smith JA, set forth the proposition that '. . . an 
adjacent landowner has no property in or right to subterranean percolating 
water until it arrives underneath his soil . . . therefore no property or right of 
his is injured by the abstraction of the percolating water before it arrives under 
his land'.(45) Again this at least seems to imply that such underground water is 
the property of the landowner when it arrives beneath his land. 
4.1.4 General points in Scots water law 
As Whitty has remarked, '[t]he development of the Scots law of water rights 
broadly follows the familiar three-stage pattern found in areas throughout 
Scots law: a first medieval reception of English (Glanvillian) law, followed by 
a reception of Roman law as developed in the European jus commune, 
followed by a second reception of English law beginning in the late eighteenth 
century.'(46)  
It is of little surprise therefore that there are a number of marked similarities 
between Scottish and English law relating to property rights in water, although 
at times marked variances in approaches can be seen. 
In relation to ownership of water, Scots law adopts the Roman law distinction 
between running water and standing water. As Stair states, 'running waters are 
common to all men, because they have no bounds; but water standing, and 
capable of bounds, is appropriated'.(47) Reid suggests that '[r]unning water, at 
least when left to run in its natural state, is treated as ownerless'.(48) As we 
shall see below, it is at least arguable that this is not always the case. 
4.1.5 Riparian rights in Scotland 
Again in similarity to English common law, certain riparian rights in water in 
a defined channel which fall short of full ownership vest in riparian 
proprietors.(49) For example, a riparian proprietor has a general right to make 
use of water which passes over his land and may consume it for domestic 
(although not industrial) purposes.(50) 
In relation to surface water outside of a definite channel, it appears like the 
position under English common law; it may be used freely by the proprietor of 
the land in which it is found and the limitations on such use in respect of water 
in a defined channel have no role to play here.(51) The same applies to 
underground water not in a known and defined channel - a principle derived 
from civil law.(52) 
The one exception to this rule is that unlike the position of English law in this 
respect, a proprietor cannot intercept percolating water and hence cut off 
supply to the inferior heritor for purely spiteful reasons.(53) This is because in 
Scotland the right to drain away the water is subject to the doctrine aemulatio 
vicini under the law of nuisance.(54) 
Reid's view that running water is not capable of ownership is perhaps 
somewhat debatable. This view, based upon the writings of Erskine and 
Bankton,(55) was also followed in by the court in Morris v Bicket.(56). This view 
is by no means unanimous, however. Although Rankine does support the 
traditional viewpoint that water in a defined channel is owned by no one,(57) he 
views that in certain cases it may be that running water not in a defined and 
known channel may be held to be the property of the landowner.(58) 
What amounts to 'running' is also open to question. Does 'running' necessarily 
entail it running in a known, defined way or is water percolating underground 
in a random or unknown fashion included within such a definition? The 
Encyclopaedia of Scots Law, for example, appears to agree with the traditional 
Reid/Bankton/Erskine viewpoint, when it states that 'running water is a res 
communis . . . the property of no-one'.(59) A little later, however(60), it states 
'water not in any defined channel, but distributed over the surface or through 
the strata of soil is regarded as pars soli; like minerals and everything else a 
coelo usque ad centrum, it is the property of the proprietor upon whose land it 
falls'.(61) 
This viewpoint that there may be property in underground percolating water 
was followed by the court in Crichton v Turnbull.(62) This case concerned a 
disposition which attempted to convey the 'windmill, pump, well and water 
supply and piping' as separate tenements in a field which was to be retained by 
the landowner. In holding that a conveyance of a separate tenement of the 
water was not competent, Lord Moncrief viewed that percolating water was 
pars soli and could not therefore be conveyed separately from the land 
itself.(63) Such views relating to percolating underground water are influenced 
by English law in this regard and based upon the dictum of the Lord Chief 
Justice in Acton v Blundell (explained above). 
4.2 Rights of property in fugacious minerals and other sub-soil 
materials 
Under both Scots and English common law, all mines and minerals that lie 
beneath the soil are the property of the owner of the solum, a coelo usque ad 
centrum.(64) The common law position as to fugacious minerals such as 
hydrocarbons has never been as clear-cut, however. Prior to the statutory 
intervention of 1934, which vested all petroleum on-shore rights in the Crown, 
it was unclear as to the extent and nature of property rights held in situ in 
petroleum reserves. Indeed, the government of the day argued that given the 
uncertainties which shrouded common law rights to petroleum in situ the 
drastic step of vesting such rights in the Crown was necessary to facilitate 
exploration.(65) Much debate centred at this time on whether it was possible to 
own such a fugacious mineral, in situ, or, given its vagrant characteristics, 
petroleum was (akin to perceptions relating to subterranean water(66)) merely 
res nullius until reduced into possession. 
Given the fact that petroleum reserves (which includes oil and natural gas) 
have been vested in the Crown through statute, there is a dearth of judicial 
authority in the UK concerning the property rights that landowners hold in oil 
and gas deposits on their land. In light of a spate of US cases regarding rights 
of ownership in petroleum reserves, it seems prudent, however, to examine 
some of the common law theories of ownership that have developed Stateside. 
Additionally, a clutch of UK and Commonwealth cases dealing with fugacious 
and semi-fugacious minerals and other sub-soil properties may provide some 
guidance in this area. 
4.3 US theories of ownership of hydrocarbons 
Given the multi-jurisdictional character of the legal landscape in the US, it 
will hold few surprises that a number of different theories of ownership of 
hydrocarbons have been recognised there. 
4.3.1 Hydrocarbons as res nullius 
At the time of the first cases relating to property rights in hydrocarbons, the 
US courts found it difficult to reconcile traditional notions of ownership with a 
substance that moved of its own volition to and fro beneath the soil. Given the 
fact that it was perceived that only wild animals and running waters shared 
these vagrant characteristics, the courts were quick to draw analogies with 
such things and apply their interpretations of English common law relating to 
such issues to hydrocarbons.(67) Such analogies generally led to the result that 
a landowner would have no property in underground hydrocarbon deposits 
until the same was extracted and reduced into possession.(68) 
It should be pointed out at this stage that the analogy drawn between 
hydrocarbons and water or animals, ferae naturae, is somewhat misleading 
and was fuelled by a misconception and lack of judicial knowledge concerning 
the nature of oil and gas in strata that prevailed at the time of these decisions. 
As is now widely recognised, neither the migratory and fugacious nature of 
water or the vagrant characteristics of wild animals can readily be attributed to 
hydrocarbons given that '[o]il and gas occur in essentially closed systems with 
possible ownership restricted to the owners overlying the reservoir'.(69) 
Moreover, until tapped these minerals do tend to remain relatively stable 
within a given reservoir.(70) 
These early court decisions were very much rooted in a formalist legal theory. 
Such a formalist approach considers legal reasoning to be a deduction that 
proceeds from general rules established in previous cases. Where no similar 
cases in fact exist, the courts attempt to draw analogies to find relevant rules 
that can be applied.(71) 
Today, the law relating to the ownership of oil and gas in most US states has 
developed since the early decisions and can now be divided into two main 
theories: first, a recognition of ownership of hydrocarbons 'in place' beneath 
the surface of the ground; and secondly, those that recognise no ownership in 
hydrocarbons in situ, only a qualified proprietary right to search for and 
reduce the same into possession. 
4.3.2 'Texas theory' 
The theory of absolute ownership, often referred to as 'Texas theory' on 
account of its origins, prescribes that the estate in petroleum reserves is a 
'defeasible' or 'determinable' fee.(72) In what can be seen as strict adherence to 
the maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, the fee 
holder owns oil and gas to the same extent that he owns other, non-fugacious 
minerals. 
4.3.3 Qualified ownership 
The other popular American theory does not accept that full ownership can be 
vested in oil and gas in situ. Under the theory of 'qualified ownership', the 
landowner or lessee, whilst not having full property rights in situ to the 
resource, does have a recognised right to acquire such absolute title by 
reducing the hydrocarbons into possession. This proprietary right is analogous 
with a profit a prendre under English common law or a servitude right to 
minerals under Scots law.(73) 
4.4 English/Commonwealth cases relating to subsoil substances 
UK and Commonwealth cases relating to fugacious subsoil substances may 
also prove instructive in this area. The majority of these cases, however, are 
concerned with issues of support rather than property in the migratory thing 
and are hence dealt with below in the law of capture section.(74) 
4.4.1 Natural gas 
Two contradictory cases on the extent to which property rights may be said to 
exist in natural gas in situ can be mentioned at this point, however. 
In U Po Naing v Burma Oil Company,(75) the defendants had a lease to a 
number of oil well 'sites' and right to take oil from them. In attempting to 
extract the oil, the defendants, although largely unsuccessful in this respect, 
did manage to draw out large quantities of gas. The plaintiff proceeded to raise 
an action against the defendants on the ground that the gas was his property. 
The Privy Council opined, however, that the plaintiff did not own the natural 
gas obtained from wells sunk for the purposes of extracting petroleum because 
natural gas, in situ, as a migratory substance akin to underground percolating 
water is res nullius, and therefore not a subject of ownership. 
The Privy Council, however, performed a notable volte face in the ensuing 
Boyrs v Canadian Pacific Railway decision.(76) In this case, CPR sold land to 
Boyrs, subject to reservation of petroleum. The petroleum was then leased 
separately to an oil company which proceeded to commence drilling activities. 
Boyrs subsequently sought an injunction on the grounds that the 'cap of gas' 
which he owned on top of the oil would be lost on extraction. In denying the 
injunction, the court was nonetheless '. . . prepared to assume that the gas 
whilst in situ is the property of the [landowner] even though it has not been 
reduced into possession'.(77) This is in direct contrast to the opinion of the 
court in U Po Naing that gas in situ is res nullius. As we shall see below, 
however, the fact that the gas was the property of the landowner had no 
bearing on the fact that it could legitimately be captured by the drilling party. 
4.4.2 Fugacious minerals in Scots Law 
Given the paucity of case-law, it remains unclear what the position regarding 
property rights in fugacious minerals and other such sub-soil substances would 
be regarded as in Scots law. We may speculate as to what the position would 
be by deducing from general principles. It is incontrovertible that the maxim 
cujus est solum is a principle of Scots law. It therefore follows that in general 
minerals are pars soli and owned in situ. Whilst the position regarding 
underground percolating water is unclear and is plausibly best viewed as res 
nullius, it would appear that given the relatively stable nature of oil and gas, 
there is no reason why such hydrocarbons would not best be viewed as pars 
soli and hence owned in situ. 
 
5. A law of capture? 
In general terms, a law of capture would sanction the appropriation by an 
adjacent landowner of property which may either be the property of another 
person or is (albeit perhaps temporarily) present on the other party's land in 
some way. Thus, the physical act of capture is sanctioned by the law. Some 
cases also involve the idea of legal capture in the sense that the physical act of 
capture also implies the acquisition of ownership. 
Whether capture is merely physical or physical and legal, the key point is that 
it involves human intervention and this should be contrasted with property 
passing by natural causes - for example, when a wild animal strays across a 
boundary or escapes and is caught by another, or when water runs freely from 
one tract of land to another. 
It should be noted that in examining whether or not such a law of capture 
exists the issues which the court must determine may not always be the same. 
This is because in some cases, the value of the object itself which is being 
captured is the important factor (for example, hydrocarbons) - in other cases, 
the more likely practical issue is the consequence rendered by capture of the 
substance (for example, where the withdrawal of water causes adjacent land to 
subside). 
5.1 The law of capture and occupatio 
The idea of taking possession of and gaining legal title to corporeal moveable 
property is of course not a new one and the Roman doctrine of occupatio 
stipulated that anything capable of private ownership and not already owned 
could be acquired by taking possession of it.(78) It followed, therefore, that 
property in underground water or wild animals could vest in the first person to 
capture or contain such things. Under the classic Roman formulation, the 
doctrine of occupatio applied both to things which had never been owned and 
to those which had ceased to be owned. Although the doctrine of occupatio 
has been adopted by Scots law, the general rule is that it only sanctions the 
appropriation of things that have never had an owner.(79) Things which had 
been once owned but have since been lost or given up generally belong to the 
Crown.(80) 
The key point to note about occupatio is that even under its Roman 
formulation it has never sanctioned the appropriation of things that are 
currently the property of another party. Hence, in relation to migratory things, 
where the thing is owned in situ then it follows that another party cannot draw 
that thing away and claim rights of ownership in it on the grounds of 
occupatio. Once ownership of the migratory thing has been lost by the original 
owner, then (akin to the practical rule relating to wild animals) it may be 
appropriated by another under Scots law. It is hard to see, however, that Scots 
law would allow occupatio to occur when ownership is lost because of the act 
of the capturing party. For example, it is one thing for oil to migrate by natural 
causes to beneath the land of another; it is quite another for that oil to migrate 
because of the drilling activities of the other party. 
The situation may of course be different in respect of things which are res 
nullius. Since these things have never been owned, the party who appropriates 
the same should be able to claim ownership on the grounds of occupatio even 
if they have been appropriated from beneath the land of another. While this 
may be relevant in cases relating to the appropriation of hydrocarbons, the 
underground water capture cases tend more to be concerned with the drying up 
of neighbouring land and it is doubtful in these cases whether the water is in 
fact reduced into possession by the party whose works draw the water away. 
Hence, the applicability of occupatio may not be a relevant factor here. 
5.2 Water 
 
5.2.1 England and Wales 
While certain riparian rights regulate water running in a known, defined way 
entailing entitlement to a continual flow (subject to the rights of others to take 
water), it has been asserted that as a landowner has the absolute right to make 
use of water percolating under his land then he may do so even if this serves to 
capture water from beneath the lands of others which would not otherwise 
have been drawn away and that in this his motives in so doing are 
irrelevant.(81) While this may be so, the rationale behind this viewpoint has 
traditionally been based upon a clutch of early cases and it is the view of this 
writer that many of these early decisions have in fact been misunderstood. 
The earliest decision in this respect is Acton v Blundell.(82) The headnote to 
this case would appear to be unequivocal as it reads that '[t]he owner of land 
through which water flows in a subterranean course, has no right or interest in 
it, which will enable him to maintain an action against a landowner, who, in 
carrying on mining operations in his own land in the usual manner, drains 
away the water from the first mentioned owner, and lays his well dry'.(83) 
It is important to note, however, that this headnote does not in fact accurately 
describe the legal principle determined in this case. In Acton, the plaintiff 
supplied his cotton mill with water from an underground well. The defendant, 
on mining coal on his land, pumped water which had begun to build up in his 
mine in order to keep this structure dry. This action, however, also caused the 
plaintiff's well to dry up. 
The Lord Chief Justice stated that '[t]he person who owns the surface may dig 
therein and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and 
pleasure, and that if, in the exercise of such a right, he intercepts or drains off 
the water collected from underground springs in his neighbour's well, this 
inconvenience to his neighbour falls within the description of damnum absque 
injuria, which cannot become the ground of an action'.(84) 
Although this seems unequivocal, it should be noted that the pleading in the 
case was somewhat vague and the judgement slightly confused. As MacIntyre 
has noted, on a true interpretation of the facts, '[t]he vital point to note is that 
no water was ever abstracted from the plaintiff's land. It was just prevented 
from getting there, which is an entirely different thing'(85) (emphasis added). 
Although the Lord Justice did view that the water lying underneath the 
proprietor's land (which he incidentally viewed as pars soli) could be 
appropriated by the lawful works of another, this comment was not directly 
relevant to the facts of the case and should therefore be viewed as merely 
obiter. On the facts, therefore, the case does not support the right to 
appropriate underground water from beneath the land of another. 
Subsequent cases which have been referred to in support of the notion that a 
law of capture relates to subterranean water include Chasemore v Richards(86) 
and Bradford v Pickles(87). In Chasemore, a House of Lords decision which 
has been said to form the leading authority in the area,(88) the Board of Health 
for Croydon dug a large well which reduced the flow of the local river. A mill-
owner who had hitherto utilised the water of the river to drive his mill now 
found his operations thwarted by a water shortage. 
Again writers have latched on to this case as supporting the notion that water 
may be legitimately extracted from beneath another's land. Ferguson, for 
example, asserts that '[Chasemore] has definitely established that a proprietor 
can exhaust the percolating underground water on his own land, and that he 
can do so irrespective of the extent to which it percolates from his neighbour's 
land, or his operations effect his neighbours well'.(89) It is submitted that this 
viewpoint is flawed. In Chasemore, a study of the facts reveals that the water 
had been intercepted prior to it reaching the plaintiff's land, therefore, 
extraction of the water from beneath that land did not occur. Similarly, in 
Bradford, the plaintiff was held entitled to sink wells into high ground, which 
intercepted water on its journey to the plaintiff's reservoir. Again, however, it 
is important to note that interception occurred prior to the water reaching the 
plaintiff's land. 
Despite the misconceptions concerning these early cases, there is nonetheless 
direct authority that suggests that underground water can be appropriated from 
beneath an adjacent land without committing any actionable wrong. The 
earliest case seems to be Popplewell v Hodkinson (1869) Exch LR 248.(90) 
Importantly, what this case hinges upon is not whether ownership is possible 
in underground water but whether a right of support of the water exists at 
common law. Indeed, it was conceded by counsel for the pursuers that 
'[a]ccording to Chasemore v Richards, and other cases, a man cannot claim a 
right to subterranean water as such'. As has been noted, it is arguable that this 
may not be the case and indeed this submission is contrary to the Lord Chief 
Justice's opinion in Acton v Blundell that underground water is pars soli. 
Nonetheless, Counsel contended that the lack of property rights in 
underground water did not mean that there was no right to support of the water 
and averred that the maxim sic utere ut alienum non laedas applied. He 
pointed to dicta to this effect in North Eastern Railway Company v Elliot.(91) 
This argument was rejected by the Court, however. Cockburn CJ opined that 
'[a]lthough there is no doubt that a man has no right to withdraw from his 
neighbour the support of adjacent soil, there is nothing at common law to 
prevent his draining the soil, if, for any reason it becomes necessary or 
convenient for him to do so'.(92) This remark suggests that the law here is 
primarily concerned with the balancing of competing rights and implies that 
the absolute right to drain water takes precedence over the right of support. 
Popplewell has been followed in more recent judgements including Langbrook 
Properties Ltd v Surrey County Council (1970 1 WLR 161) and Thomas v 
Gulf Oil Refining Ltd.(93) It was held in Langbrook that the plaintiffs had no 
cause of action either in nuisance or in negligence when the defendants, in 
draining water from their own land, as an incident to this, also drained away 
percolating water from the plaintiff's land. Although the defendant's actions 
caused the plaintiff injury, this was a case of damnum sine injuria. Again the 
case turned on the fact that there was no natural right of support in respect of 
underground water.(94) 
Despite this right to drain water away from beneath an adjacent proprietor's 
land, there is some authority to suggest that if a landowner drains water 
percolating from beneath his land and this has the effect to conflict with the 
rights of others in a flowing stream (for example, to drain water away from 
that stream) then such an action may be prevented by the parties so effected. 
In the case of Grand Junction Canal v Shugar,(95) Hatherley LC, overruling 
the judgement of Jessel MR, held that where a landowner's operations had the 
effect of draining off water which was flowing in a natural stream then he may 
be prohibited in so doing. At p. 488, he stated: 
If you cannot get at underground water without touching the water in a defined surface 
channel, you cannot get it at all. You are not by your operations, or by any act of yours, to 
diminish the water which runs in the defined channel, because that is not only for yourself, but 
for your neighbours also, who have a clear right to use it, and have it come to them 
unimpaired in quality and undiminished in quantity. 
This judgement has subsequently been interpreted in a very narrow sense, 
however. In what may appear a somewhat creative decision, Lord Alverstone 
in the case of English v Metropolitan Water Board(96) took the view that in 
Grand Junction Canal Lord Hatherley in fact ruled against the defendant's 
direct tapping of the stream by bringing his drain into immediate connection 
with it. His view in this respect was influenced by the opinion of Vaughan 
Williams LJ in Jordenson v Sutton, Southcoates and Drypool Gas Co where 
he said: 
With regard to Grand Junction Canal Co. v Shugar it seems tolerably clear from the longer 
report of this case in the Law Times that Lord Hatherley treated the case as one in which there 
was a direct tapping of an overground stream flowing in a defined channel, and not merely a 
withdrawal of percolating underground water indirectly affecting the underground stream. 
Whether this was in fact what Lord Hatherley intended - and it is doubtful 
from the facts of the case whether such a viewpoint is really sustainable - his 
general approach has been rejected in Scotland, however, on practical grounds 
as outlined below. 
5.2.2 Scotland 
In relation to whether or not underground water can be 'captured' from beneath 
another's land in Scotland, it appears that Scots law has been influenced by 
case-law south of the border. Ferguson, for example, points to the House of 
Lords decision in Chasemore v Richards as authority for the notion that water 
may be extracted from beneath another's land without any action lying. As this 
article has already pointed out, Chasemore should not be read as giving 
authority to this proposition although there is now ample other authority to 
suggest that this principle has been accepted into English law.(97) 
There appears to be a paucity of cases in this area. As Lyall merely notes, 
'[t]he position may be the same in Scotland'.(98) One important case in this area 
is Milton v Glen-Moray Glenlivet Distillery.(99) In Milton, the court held that in 
relation to subterranean water, any water which percolates onto that land by 
natural causes may be intercepted and extracted by the owner of the land - it 
being no objection that the water has percolated from or on route to a stream 
or piece of land belonging to someone else.(100) 
In Milton, a lower heritor of a stream brought an action against a higher heritor 
who sunk a well 12 feet from the stream to supply water to his distillery, 
which had the effect of drying up the lower heritor's land. While recognising 
that under Chasemore a landowner is entitled to freely appropriate 
subterranean water which would otherwise feed a stream, Counsel for the 
pursuer suggested that '[i]f it is proved that the well is fed in whole or in part 
by water which has once flowed in the stream the withdrawal of that water 
(even by percolation through the bed of the stream and thence through the 
intervening strata) is outside the principle in the case of Chasemore, and falls 
under the general rules which regulate the rights of riparian owners in rivers 
and streams'.(101) Counsel relied upon the English decision of Grand Junction 
Canal Co v Shugar which has been explained above.(102) 
Pointing to the impracticality of such a position, Lord Hatherley's view was 
given short shrift in Milton by Lord Kyllachy (whose judgement was affirmed 
by the Inner House. He stated: 
It does . . . appear to me that . . . his Lordship's decision . . . is extremely difficult to support 
. . . or reconcile . . . with the principles laid down so authoritatively in the case of Chasemore 
v Richards. In the first place, the doctrine is not, in my judgement, a workable doctrine. Not to 
mention extreme cases . . . there is hardly, I should think, a coal or iron pit in this country 
which does not to some extent drain from the neighbouring strata and pump to the surface 
water that has at some time flowed in a neighbouring stream. Indeed I should think that the 
instances must be numerable in which mining operations quite sensibly affect the level of 
neighbouring watercourses. Similarly, there are, I should think, few systems of agricultural 
drainage . . . which do not, more or less, have a like result.(103) 
It should also be noted that in this particular case the drainage from the stream 
was minimal and had no practical effect on water levels. In the view of the 
Inner House, such extraction from a defined stream would have to be at least 
material before any action might lie.(104) This leaves open the question as to 
whether liability might follow from the significant tapping of a defined stream. 
Would the case be different if the abstraction served to take water away from 
beneath a neighbouring land with the effect that support is withdrawn? We 
have already seen - according to the general principle set out under English 
common law in Popplewell - that no action would lie on the basis that there is 
no right of support in relation to underground water. If one examines Bald v 
Alloa Colliery,(105) it may appear at first blush that the position may be 
different in Scotland. In Bald, a proprietor granted a feu of a piece of land but 
reserved the minerals. On the land, buildings had been erected and they stood 
above water-filled coal wastes supported by water, which in turn supported the 
surface of the land. The proprietor subsequently granted the minerals to a third 
party, who began pumping out the subterranean water, which in turn caused 
subsidence entailing damage to the surface and a number of buildings that had 
existed at the time of the grant. In an action brought by the feuer of the land, 
both the granter and the mineral tenants were found liable for the damage 
caused on the basis that the party who withdraws the support does so at his 
peril. 
While this may appear to be inconsistent with the English case of Popplewell, 
it has been argued that Bald and Popplewell are in fact reconcilable on the 
basis that Bald is different as it involves adherence to the principle that 'a man 
cannot derogate from his own grant'. As has been noted, 
[i]n Popplewell's case CJ Cockburn said 'Although there is no doubt that a man has no right to 
withdraw from his neighbour the support of the adjacent soil, there is nothing at common law 
to prevent him draining that soil, if for any reason it becomes necessary or convenient for him 
to do so. It may be, indeed, that where one grants land to another for some special purpose - 
for building purposes, for example - then since according to the old maxim “man cannot 
derogate from his own grant”, the grantor could not do anything whatever with his own land 
which might have the effect of rendering the land granted less fit for the special purpose in 
question than it otherwise might have been.'(106) 
The exception here pointed at seems precisely to cover and explain the 
principle set out in Bald.(107) 
While this argument is attractive, it is not entirely persuasive. Clearly the fact 
that the granter had feued the land to the pursuer and then leased the minerals 
to the mineral tenant in the knowledge that working the minerals would cause 
subsidence and damage to the land and buildings thereon influenced the court 
in finding that party liable. The decision that the pumping away of the water 
was unlawful, however, appears firmly grounded on the general principle that 
'[t]he party who withdraws the natural support, or the artificial support which 
comes in place of the natural support, does so at his peril'.(108) By implication 
of the facts of the case such an obligation not to remove support extends to the 
support of underground water - contrary to the English position. The 
arguments presented in the case make no reference to rights of property in 
underground water. It is possible, however, that if the court had been willing 
to hold that by virtue of the rule set out in the maxim a coelo usque ad 
centrum, such underground water was pars soli and hence the pursuer's 
property, then arguably a case could have proceeded on the basis of the 
misappropriation by the defenders of the pursuer's property. 
5.3 The law of capture and hydrocarbons 
As we have already noted, UK cases in this area are distinctly thin on the 
ground in this area. Nonetheless, in addition to English case-law, a smattering 
of Commonwealth cases and some American material can be referred to in an 
effort to establish some general principles. 
5.3.1 USA guidance on hydrocarbons 
The law of capture originated during the late 19th century USA oil boom. The 
seminal decision in this respect is the 1899 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
case of Westmorland and Cambria Natural Gas Co v De Witt.(109) In this case, 
the court, in affirming the existence of a law of capture, ruled that 
[h]ydrocarbons, like wild animals but unlike other minerals, have the tendency and the power 
to escape, even against the will of its owner and to continue to be his property only while 
within the area subject to his control, but when they migrate to other areas or fall under the 
control of other persons, that title to the previous owner disappears Therefore possession of 
the land does not necessarily involve possession of the hydrocarbons. If someone drilling on 
his own land reaches the common deposit and obtains through those wells the hydrocarbons of 
neighbouring areas, the ownership of that oil and gas passes to whoever produced it . . .(110) 
Following on from this decision, the subsequent case of Barnard v 
Monongahela Nat Gas Co(111) in a similar fashion afforded little protection for 
those whose oil was extracted from beneath their feet. In the opinion of the 
court, the only option available to concerned oil-men was to 'use it or lose it' 
and make haste drilling their own wells. It is important to place these court 
judgements within the context of the industry at the time. The decisions of 
these courts set out a rule of convenience to meet the energy needs of a 
growing nation. Without such a rule and any agreements between adjacent 
landowners, the oil simply could not have been extracted without incurring 
legal sanction.(112) As McIlvaine PJ noted in Barnard '[the law of capture] may 
not be the best rule, but neither the legislature nor the highest court has given 
us any better'. 
In relation to ownership in situ, for example, it is recognised that given the 
fugacious nature of oil and gas, absolute ownership simply ceases if the oil 
and gas migrates.(113) This caveat goes so far as to sanction the 'capture' of 
hydrocarbons from beneath one tract of land caused by the lawful operations 
of an adjacent landowner. As the Supreme Court of Texas viewed, 
[t]he rule is simply that the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he 
produces from wells to his land, though part of the oil and gas may have migrated from 
adjoining lands. He may thus appropriate the oil and gas that have flowed from adjacent lands 
without the consent of the owner of those lands and without incurring liability to him for 
drainage. The non-liability is based upon the theory that after drainage the title or interest of 
the former owner is gone.(114) 
Many states have found, however, the absolute ownership theory untenable 
not only in relation to the question of how full ownership can vest in 
substances over which a landowner has neither possession nor control but also 
because the rule of capture is viewed as being anathema to this doctrine's 
central theme, in that if someone has ownership in a thing, how can a legal 
system sanction its appropriation by another without the owner's consent?' It 
has been argued that 
[t]his result was contrary to the essential characteristic of ownership, viz., the right of an 
owner to follow and to re-acquire his property from one who has removed it without 
permission, and concluded that oil and gas are incapable of being owned apart from the rest of 
the land until actually reduced to possession, the right of the landowner being one to search 
for and produce such products.(115) 
To sum up the position as it relates to hydrocarbons in the USA, it appears that 
whether or not hydrocarbons are viewed as being owned in situ, subject to a 
proprietary right to reduce into possession, or res nullius is not a relevant 
factor and legitimate drilling activities can lawfully appropriate hydrocarbons 
that have been drawn from beneath another's land regardless of property rights 
in situ.(116) 
5.3.2 Commonwealth guidance - natural gas 
Two of the most important Commonwealth cases relating to the capture of 
natural gas are U Po Naing v Burma Oil Company(117) and Boyrs v Canadian 
Pacific Railway(118). As we saw previously, the court rulings were not 
consistent as to the nature of property rights in the gas reserves in strata. As 
we shall see, however, the question of what property rights existed in the gas 
had no bearing on whether or not a law of capture would operate. 
In U Po Naing, the court simply viewed that the gas was res nullius and hence 
belonged to no one until reduced into possession and therefore the first party 
acquiring the gas took title to it. In Boyrs, the court denied a claim for 
injunction where the respondents had been granted a lease to drill for oil. 
Notwithstanding that the plaintiff's 'cap of gas' at the top of the oil would be 
lost on extraction, their Lordships were not prepared to hold '. . . that the [oil 
company] is under an obligation to conserve the appellant's gas with the 
consequent denial of the right to recover the petroleum in the usual way'.(119) 
This judgement was arrived at despite the fact that it was accepted by the court 
that the natural gas could be owned in situ. 
The most salient issue in Boyrs therefore is clearly not one of ownership but 
rather the balancing of rights. As their Lordships noted, '[t]he question is not 
whose property the gas is, but what means the respondents may use to recover 
their petroleum'.(120) The most important aspect of the judgement in terms of 
balancing the opposing rights of the applicants, however, seems to have been 
the fact that the respondents were the recipients of an express grant of the 
petroleum in respect of which it must be implied that there was a right to work 
the same.(121) As their Lordships remarked '[t]he main strength of the 
respondents' case is that they have a direct grant of the petroleum, whereas the 
appellant has merely such residual rights as remain in him subject to the grant 
of the petroleum'.(122) 
The fact that work was carried out in accordance with usual practice was also 
seen to be in the respondent's favour. Counsel for the appellants had contended 
that the earlier case of Barnard-Argue-Roth-Stearns Oil & Gas Co Ltd v 
Farquarson(123) was authority for the proposition that in working reserved 
petroleum, the respondents must take care to preserve the appellant's gas. 
Their Lordships held that the key point in Farquarson (which in fact related to 
the reservation of 'springs of oil') was that in that particular case the owners of 
the oil did not recover their oil in the normal way but rather did so by tapping 
the respondent's gas in a 'different container'.(124) Later in the Farquarson 
judgement, the court affirmed the general rule which was subsequently 
followed in Boyrs: 
[t]he company are clearly entitled to search for and work for oil in these springs of oil and to 
win and carry it away from them, provided they do so in a reasonable manner and do as little 
injury as possible. While the point does not arise in this appeal for decision, their Lordships 
think that the company would not be responsible for any inconvenience or loss which might 
be caused to the respondents . . . in the conduct of their operations in the manner 
mentioned.(125) 
In Boyrs it was pointed out that the only possible grounds of challenge might 
have been under the appellant's right of support, had the surface been 
disturbed. As there was no evidence of subsidence, this point was not 
considered further by the court.(126) 
5.3.3 Asphalt (pitch) 
The decision of the Privy Council in Trinidad Asphalt v Ambard(127) is 
particularly pertinent and at first glance seems to support a thesis denying 
operation of a US-fashioned law of capture. When the defendants dug away 
their land, the semi-solid pitch or asphalt present on the plaintiff's land that 
oozed over into the defendant's border when exposed to the elements, was 
subsequently appropriated by defendants. The defendant's excavation also 
damaged buildings on the plaintiff's land. This was caused by the subsidence 
that had resulted from the removal of the pitch. The Privy Council were 
prepared to hold that there had been an actionable wrong and awarded 
damages in respect of not only damage to buildings but also the value of the 
pitch itself (which greatly exceeded the value of the buildings) on the basis 
that the pitch, as part of the soil (and hence owned in situ) carried with it a 
right of support which had now been eroded. The fact that damages were 
awarded in respect of the subsidence to the buildings caused by the removal of 
support should not surprise us unduly. What is more surprising is that damages 
for appropriation of the pitch were awarded. At no point in the judgement does 
the court rule on whether the defendant's actions amounted to theft. 
In the rather opaque judgement, damages in respect of the pitch appear rather 
to have been awarded more on an equitable basis. The previous order of the 
full court in appeal that damages be payable only in respect to damages to 
property on the plaintiff's land was in the opinion of Lord MacNaghten of the 
Privy Council, '[a] conclusion so lame and impotent [that it is] hardly in 
accordance with the principles of equity or common sense'.(128) The damages 
the Privy Council deemed suitable were in accordance with the original 
judgement of the Chief Justice and as such payable in relation to the 'injury 
[caused] by the loss of the [pitch]'.(129) 
5.3.4 Running silt 
In Jordenson v Sutton, Southcoates and Drypool Gas Co,(130) which involved 
the withdrawal of silt from beneath another's land, the case was determined by 
reference to the fact that silt (unlike water) should be viewed as part of the soil 
and therefore subject to a right of support. When the actions of the defendants 
served to remove the silt from the plaintiff's land and hence cause subsidence, 
an actionable wrong had taken place and a claim for damages was upheld. The 
issue of property in the silt was not directly relevant to the analysis. Unlike 
Trinidad Asphalt, there was no conscious effort to 'capture' the silt as this was 
merely a by-product of the work undertaken on the defendant's land. The silt 
was itself of no value and hence no damages were sought in relation to the silt 
itself. 
5.3.5 Brine 
The first case dealing with the removal of brine (salt dissolved in water) from 
beneath the land of another is Salt Union Ltd v Brunner, Mond and Co.(131) 
When it was alleged that the removal of brine from beneath an adjacent 
property caused the land to subside, the court was able to sidestep the issue of 
whether this amounted to an actionable wrong as on the facts the court was not 
satisfied it had been proven that the defendant's pumping activities had caused 
the subsidence. The (obiter) words of Alverstone CJ, suggest, however, that 
where legitimate pumping activities caused brine to be appropriated from 
beneath an adjacent land and this caused removal of support, there would be 
no actionable wrong as, akin to running waters, the right of support did not 
extend to underground brine. 
A different view was taken in the subsequent case of Lotus Ltd v British Soda 
Co(132) In this case, serious damage had been caused to buildings on a factory 
site belonging to the plaintiff due to subsidence of his land caused by 'wild 
brine' pumping by the defendants on nearby land. Wild brine pumping is the 
extraction by pumping of saturated brine resulting from the dissolution of rock 
salt by water. As the defendants extracted the brine, more water flowed 
beneath L's land, which had the effect to dissolve more salt. The resultant 
brine was pumped away to be replaced by yet more water, which resulted in 
the subsidence. The defendants argued that in pumping the brine in this 
manner, no action should lie as 'there is no distinction between brine and water 
when considering what may be pumped from beneath one's soil. Brine is 
merely water containing some degree of salt, and indeed all water contains 
some salt' and pointed, inter alia to dicta in Salt Union Ltd v Brunner, Mond 
& Co as authority for this proposition.(133) The plaintiffs, however, pointed to 
the fact that 'no question arises in the present case of a right to support from 
water, or even from brine, as opposed to a right of support from solid rock salt' 
(emphasis added).(134) It was argued that the fact that such a mineral was part 
of the soil gave rise to a right of support. The court agreed with this viewpoint 
and following Jordenson v Sutton, Southcoates and Drypool Gas Co(135) found 
that the defendants were liable in damages. Additionally, L Ltd were entitled 
to claim an injunction to prohibit further such pumping by the defendants. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
6.1 Comparing ownership rights 
In respect of the extent that property rights can be said to be held in migratory 
things on land and whether or not such rights are meaningful in the face of the 
intervening acts of others, it is trite to remark that a review of the authorities 
fails to reveal one all-encompassing approach or doctrine applicable to all 
migratory things across Scotland and England. It is clear that the law does at 
times recognise that a landowner has property rights in such migratory things, 
as part of the soil, even before they are reduced into possession: under 
England law, for example, asphalt, silt, arguably natural gas and perhaps 
subterranean water (although not in a defined channel) may be treated as pars 
soli. Under Scots law, where the case-law is more sparse, it seems likely that 
the doctrine cujus est solum will be adhered to in a stricter sense than in 
England and it follows therefore that hydrocarbons and other fugacious sub-
soil substances would be seen as pars soli and at least arguably the same could 
be said to apply to underground water percolating in a random fashion, 
although the case-law is conflicting. Such a varied approach to ownership of 
migratory things clearly illustrates the somewhat limited utility of such a 
blanket doctrine as cujus est solum in relation to landownership. 
6.2 A law of capture and rights of support 
Whether or not a law of capture exists is again not an easy question to answer. 
Under English law, the extent to which a law of capture exists appears to be 
determined not by reference to property rights but rather by balancing the 
correlative rights of the parties concerned. Where a landowner carries out 
legitimate activities that have the effect that the thing migrates from an 
adjacent land, then in general it would seem that no action will lie, except 
where a right of support has been eroded. 
It can be seen, however, that while under English common law a right of 
support seems to exist in respect of migratory subsoil substances such as silt 
and rock salt, unlike the position in Scotland there is no such right in relation 
to underground water. Why this should be so is unclear. Although property 
rights barely feature in the cases, arguably a right of support exists in the such 
things as silt and rock salt because these substances are part of the soil, 
whereas underground water which is res nullius. Furthermore, it seems from 
the reasoning employed in Popplewell that the unlimited right to extract 
underground water is simply taken to outweigh any correlative right of 
support. Such a distinction between underground water and other subsoil 
substances, is of course wholly artificial. Land is rarely supported by water or 
minerals alone, but rather by a mixture of the two, and substances such as silt 
are themselves suspended in water. 
Moreover, it has been argued that cases such as Popplewell and Langbrook 
Properties have in fact stretched what the courts determined in early decisions 
such as Bradford v Pickles. As Harwood has remarked, '[i]n [Bradford] the 
wrong alleged was simply deprivation of the plaintiff's supply of water, not 
physical damage to his property. In effect the plaintiffs were complaining 
about nothing more than economic competition',(136) which is to be contrasted 
with a situation where the drainage of water causes damage to the property of 
another. Drawing away water which has the effect of drying another's land is 
arguably no more than a classic illustration of the maxim sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas, and hence one which should raise the possibility of an 
action based on negligence or nuisance. Surely there is a case for arguing that 
while perhaps on policy grounds there should not be an absolute right of 
support of underground water, where a party draws away water in a reckless or 
negligent fashion, then this should allow the aggrieved party to raise an action 
based on negligence or nuisance. Such an approach has found favour in a 
number of US states.(137) 
6.3 Capture when there is no erosion of support 
It is clear that where a migratory thing is removed from the land of another 
and no action can be brought under removal of support, whether or not the 
substance is owned in situ appears to be of little relevance - at least under 
English common law. So, for example, in the Commonwealth natural gas 
cases, in the final analysis whether the gas in strata was owned in situ or was 
res nullius had no effect on whether the gas could be captured by the adjacent 
landowner. The same can be said about the many hydrocarbon cases in the 
USA. This follows the general English common law approach to remedies and 
if no remedy can be brought on a ground such as support or trespass, then no 
action will lie. The one case which does not fit snugly into this idea is 
Trinidad Asphalt, where damages were also payable for the loss of pitch as 
well as in respect of the subsidence caused by the erosion of support. This case 
can perhaps be rationalised on the basis that the capture was not simply a by-
product of the defendants working their land in the normal, lawful way but 
rather a deliberate and underhand attempt to appropriate the pitch from the 
adjacent land. The judgement, however, is opaque, not particularly satisfactory 
and displays the weakness of English law in this area. 
In Scotland, the case law is sparse. The tentative conclusions that can be 
drawn are that following the doctrine of occupatio, where the thing is to be 
treated as res nullius, then no action will lie if the thing is captured by another 
party (unless that leads to the removal of support). It may therefore be 
suggested that underground water can be appropriated from beneath the land 
of another and no action will lie for the taking, although if it were held that the 
water was pars soli it is submitted that the position may be different. 
The importance of dominium and strict adherence to the maxim cujus est 
solum may dictate that remedies will result if a thing which is owned in situ is 
captured by the activities of an adjacent landowner. So, for example, under 
Scots common law, unlike the position under its English counterpart, it may be 
speculated that remedies protecting property rights might arise where 
hydrocarbons and other subsoil substances (if they are deemed to be owned in 
situ) are captured from the land of another even where there is no removal of 
support and where the capture is merely a by-product of legitimate activities in 
working the land. 
6.4 Concerns 
It is clear that a law of capture in effect devalues ownership in that owners 
may not always be safeguarded from the actions of others. Merely arguing (as 
courts in early US oil and gas decisions did) that non-liability is based upon 
the fact that title is lost after drainage takes place misses the point. In this 
respect, we may echo the dissenting words of Sir John Taylor Coleridge in the 
case of Chasemore v Richards:(138) '[n]ow it is certainly a novel principle that 
by an operation on my own land, I may both excusably abstract, and lawfully 
convert to my own use, the underground property of my neighbour', a novel 
principle then perhaps, but one that now appears widely accepted in relation to 
migratory things at least under English law. 
Aside from such concerns, the current state of law also throws up matters of 
practical concern. While there may have been sound policy reasons behind 
allowing the law to develop in such a fashion - for example allowing the 
digging of wells that drain water from adjoining lands to facilitate land 
development, and sanctioning the draining of oil from beneath another's land 
to facilitate exploitation of the resource - it may be that such policy choices 
need to be reappraised today. For example, the issue of increasing global water 
shortages has heightened the need for legal regimes across the globe to 
instigate and develop equitable and efficient water use regimes.(139) Many US 
States, for example, have already responded to such concerns and amended 
their water use doctrines away from traditional English common law 
approaches to 'reasonable use' principles to ensure sustainability and equitable 
distribution of underground percolating water.(140) 
The issue of hydrocarbons in the UK is complicated by the fact that all 
hydrocarbons on-shore vest in the Crown and those offshore are subject to the 
exclusive proprietary right of the Crown to exploit the minerals.(141) These 
Crown rights are then licensed to others in 'blocks' under a statutory 
framework. Whether property rights are transferred to licensees and whether a 
law of capture operates under the respective licensing frameworks are 
questions that for reasons of brevity cannot be answered here. It has been 
argued, however, that despite compulsory joint development of oil fields 
which straddle two or more licence blocks, there may be some practical 
circumstances in which one licensee is able to develop the whole field even 
though this captures oil from the block of an adjacent licensee. If, as the bulk 
of the authorities (at least under English common law) suggest, a law of 
capture exists, then the adjacent licensee would have no remedy against the 
party who has taken the oil - an issue that raises significant policy 
concerns.(142) 
As a final point, it is very questionable whether the current state of English 
common law in relation to migratory things is compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in light of Article 1, Protocol 1, which 
sets out the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Clearly if a thing 
that is the subject of property in situ can be appropriated by another without 
the consent of the owner then this is contrary to the fundamental protection of 
property rights set out in the treaty. Due to space constraints, this issue cannot 
be tackled in detail here, but it may be sufficient to say that given the recent 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, which has partially brought the 
ECHR into UK domestic law, this issue may be put to the test in the UK 
courts sooner rather than later. 
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